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REAPPRAISING MINORITY
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN
FREEZEOUT MERGERS: WEINBERGER V.
UOP, INC.
Under Delaware corporation law, controlling shareholders may
effectively "freeze out"' the equitable interest of the minority
shareholders by the consummation of a merger in which cash is
exchanged for the minority shares.2 In some states, the exclusive
I A freezeout involves "the use of majority control to consummate a statutory corporate
proceeding that is intended to, and has the result of, eliminating from the corporation all of
the shareholders not a part of such control . . . ." Lynch, A Concern for the Interest of
Minority Shareholders Under Modern Corporation Laws, 3 J. CORP. L. 19, 31 (1977). The
terms "squeeze-out," see F. O'NAL, "SQUEEzE-OUTs" oF MINORry SHAREHOLDERS 1 (1975),
"take out," see Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 624, 625 (1981), "going private," see 1 M. Ln'roN & E. STEINnaRGER, TAKEovERS AND
FREEzEoUTS § 9.1, at 419 (1978), and "cash out," see Note, Delaware Corporation Law:
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.-A Limitation on Singer Fairness Standards, 42 U. Prrr. L. Ray.
915, 917 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Singer Fairness Standards], also are used to
describe such transactions. The phrases "going private" and "cash out," however, describe
particular freezeout tactics. In a going private transaction, a publicly held corporation elimi-
nates all the public investors for the purpose of ending all public trading. See Note, Fair-
ness in Freezeout Transactions: Observations on Coping with Going Private Problems, 69
Ky. L.J. 77, 77-78 (1980-1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Going Private Problems]. A cash-
out merger is one in which cash serves as the consideration for the minority's equity partici-
pation. See Note, Singer Fairness Standards, supra, at 917. Although mergers are the most
commonly used freezeout method, see Brockmeyer & Yerkes, Two-Step Acquisi-
tions-"Freezing Out" Minority Shareholders, in 1 BusNEss AcQuiSrrxONS § 19.202b, at 730
(J. Herz & C. Bailer 2d ed. 1981), a minority shareholder's interest also may be displaced by
a reverse stock split, a sale of all or substantially all assets of the corporation, dissolution, or
a tender offer by the majority shareholder, see id. § 19.201c-.201f, at 729.
" DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(4), (5) (1974 & Supp. 1982); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §
1101(d) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 902(a)(3) (McKinney 1963). At
common law, organic changes in corporate structure, such as mergers, could be effected only
through the unanimous assent of the shareholders. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311
U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941). Traditionally, the corporate charter was regarded as both a con-
tract between the corporation and the state, and a contract among the shareholders which
gave them a "vested right" in the corporation. Weiss, supra note 1, at 627. In recognition of
the need for corporate flexibility, state legislatures began to reduce the ability of minority
shareholders to dissent from fundamental changes in the corporation's structure. Id. at 626-
57. By the early 20th century, most state corporation statutes permitted merger transactions
if the corporation obtained the approval of a supermajority of the shareholders. See Carney,
Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 69, 95. The modem trend, however, is to require only a simple
majority vote. See id.
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remedy for a shareholder who opposes a merger proposal is a statu-
tory appraisal proceeding in which the court assesses the value of
the dissenting shares.3 Delaware and other jurisdictions have af-
forded greater protection to minority shareholders by providing
equitable relief, such as rescission of the merger or injunction,
when the majority is shown to have violated its fiduciary duty.4 In
Merger laws also were liberalized by cash merger statutes, which sanction the use of
cash or debt as consideration for minority shares in merger transactions. See Weiss, supra
note 1, at 632; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (cash may be
used as consideration when controlling shareholders have greater than 90% or less than
50% of shares issued by corporation). Subsequent judicial interpretation of these statutes
authorized the use of the freezeout merger. See Weiss, supra note 1, at 641. The recent
enactment of short-form merger statutes represents the most radical departure from the
strictures of the common law. See Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
596, 596-99 (1965). Under these statutes, a parent corporation may consummate a merger
without shareholder approval if the target corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary or a
subsidiary in which the parent owns at least a stated percentage of the corporation. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Supp. 1982) (90% ownership required); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.66(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) (99% ownership prerequisite); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-1983) (95% ownership necessary).
3 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Blue Chip Stamps, 172 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (Ct. App. 1981); Yanow
v. Teal Indus., 178 Conn. 262, 274-75, 422 A.2d 311, 318 (1979). The appraisal statutes were
enacted to provide a monetary substitute for the common-law vested rights negated by
modem merger statutes. See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 226 (1962). Indeed, the right of a dissenting shareholder to
demand an appraisal and have his shares purchased by the corporation did not exist at
common law. 6 Z. CAVITCH, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 112.01, at 112-4 (1983). The particu-
lars of appraisal statutes vary from state to state. Lynch, supra note 1, at 51. Generally, the
appraisal procedure is a complex one, see Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Pro-
posed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 504 (1976), and dissenting shareholders must strictly
adhere to the statute in order to invoke the remedy, see 6 Z. CAvrrcH, supra, § 112.03[1], at
112-41. Most appraisal statutes require a dissenting shareholder to object in writing to the
proposed action prior to the shareholder meeting and, if the action passes, to make a written
demand for the value of his shares. See id.
The appraisal remedy has been criticized for being excessively time consuming and
costly to dissenting shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698, 731 (1982). The new Delaware appraisal statute, however, permits both a
quasi-class action for share valuation and payment of attorney's and expert witness' fees
from a fund maintained for the dissenting shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e)-(j)
(1974 & Supp. 1982); see Rothschild, Going Private, Singer, and Rule 13e-3: What are the
Standards for Fiduciaries?, in 1 CORPORATE CouNsEL's ANNUAL-1980, at 305, 318 (J. Spires
& E. Burchell eds.).
4 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976, 980 (Del. 1977), overruled on
other grounds, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 61
Hawaii 622, 640, 607 P.2d 1036, 1046 (1980); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J.
Super. 36, 45-48, 342 A.2d 566, 571-72 (Ch. Div. 1975); see also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 879-81 (5th ed. 1980). In a freezeout merger, the
majority shareholders of a subsidiary or "target" corporation "stand on both sides of the
transaction," since they control both parties to the merger. See Note, The Fiduciary Duty
of Majority Shareholders in Freezeout Mergers: A Suggested Approach, 47 FORDHAM L.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:144
an effort to enforce the majority's duty, Delaware courts have re-
quired an acquiring corporation that is challenged by shareholder
action to demonstrate that the merger had a valid business pur-
pose and was entirely fair to the minority.5 Recently, however, in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court of Delaware, al-
though reaffirming a frozen-out shareholder's right to equitable re-
lief in the face of unfair dealing by the majority,7 discarded the
valid business purpose rule, holding that an unfair share price may
be remedied only by a Delaware statutory appraisal proceeding.8
In Weinberger, a minority shareholder of UOP, Incorporated
(UOP),9 brought a class action challenging the validity of a freeze-
out merger between UOP and Sigco, Incorporated, a wholly owned
REV. 223, 223-24 (1978). By standing on both sides of the transaction, the majority can
control the negotiations and unilaterally impose merger terms on the target corporation. See
id. The superior bargaining position of the controlling corporation in a freezeout merger,
however, creates a fiduciary relationship between parent and subsidiary. See id. at 224. The
majority shareholder thus has a fiduciary obligation to execute the merger in an inherently
fair manner. See Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. Corn.
L. 674, 676-77 (1979). Nevertheless, the existence of a fiduciary duty between controller and
controlled "does not mean that the parent has to engage in any form of self-sacrifice for the
benefit of the [subsidiary]." Id. at 677.
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have identified three types of freezeout mergers:
the two-step merger, going private, and the merger of affiliates. See Brudney & Chirelstein,
A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357-76 (1978). Each freezeout
technique evokes a different level of fiduciary duty. See id. In a two-step merger, the minor-
ity shareholders are frozen out of the corporation shortly after an outside corporation ac-
quires the controlling shares of the company through a successful tender offer. See id. at
1360. The fiduciary duty in the two-step merger is regarded as lower than that involved
when going private or in a merger of affiliates. See id. at 1361. In a going private merger, the
fiduciary duty of the majority is very high. See id. at 1365-70; infra note 30 and accompany-
ing text. An affiliates merger is one between a long-standing parent and a subsidiary corpo-
ration. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra, at 1370. Although the fiduciary duty in an affili-
ates merger is great, Brudney and Chirelstein argue that the social benefits derived from
such a transaction militate in its favor. See id. at 1370-75.
1 See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034, 1037 (Del. 1979); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976, 979-80 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus.,
379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del. 1977); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93
A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952); accord Klurfeld v. Equity Enters., Inc., 79 App. Div. 2d 124,
134-35, 436 N.Y.S.2d 303, 309 (2d Dep't 1981) (upon merger of principal corporation with
newly formed corporation owned by majority shareholders, New York applies strict scrutiny
test to majority shareholders).
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
7 Id. at 714.
8 Id. at 703-04, 714.
9 UOP was involved in several fields of business, including petrochemical services and
products, and transportation equipment products. 457 A.2d at 704. UOP's stock was pub-
licly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
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subsidiary of Signal Companies, Incorporated (Signal),10 which was
the majority shareholder of UOP. 1 Although a majority of the
shareholders formally approved the transaction,12 the plaintiff al-
leged that the merger was not entered into for a legal business pur-
pose, that the proxy information disseminated by UOP was mis-
leading, and that the minority's shares were unreasonably under-
valued.13 In addition, the plaintiff contended that UOP's board of
,0 Signal Companies, Incorporated, a technologically oriented Delaware corporation,
conducted business through several wholly owned subsidiaries. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426
A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981). The merger was executed through the Signal subsidiary,
Sigco Incorporated. Id. at 1335. Signal's stock was publicly traded on the New York, Phila-
delphia, and Pacific Stock Exchanges. 457 A.2d at 704.
1 426 A.2d at 1335. In 1975, Signal obtained 50.5%, or 5,800,000 of the outstanding
shares of UOP through a dual method of acquisition negotiated by both Signal and UOP.
457 A.2d at 704. Signal purchased 1,500,000 shares of unissued UOP stock at $21 per share,
and acquired 4,300,000 shares from the public shareholders of UOP through a successful
cash tender offer at the same price. Id. As controlling shareholder, Signal elected 6 of UOP's
13 directors. Id.
In 1978, Signal decided that the acquisition of the additional 49.5% of UOP stock not
only would be a good investment for Signal, id. at 705, but also would resolve difficulties in
managing UOP, id. at 708. Although Signal considered a price of up to $24 per share a
reasonable acquisition price, id. at 705, the board of directors, at a teleconferenced meeting
of the boards of both corporations, proposed the freezeout merger at a price of $21 per
share. Id. at 707. The non-Signal directors of UOP voted that day to accept Signal's offer.
Id. More than 2 months later, the UOP shareholders made Signal's offer effective by ap-
proving the merger at their annual meeting. Id. at 707-08; see infra note 13. Thereafter, the
plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all UOP shareholders who had not cashed in
their stock on the day the merger became effective, 426 A.2d at 1335, and sought to set aside
the merger or, in the alternative, an award of "equitable rescission"-an award granting
former minority shareholders either money damages or stock in the surviving corporation.
Id.
12 457 A.2d at 708. Pursuant to Signal's resolution, the merger would be deemed re-
jected if not approved by a majority of the minority shares voting at the meeting, or if "the
minority shares voting in favor of the merger, when coupled with Signal's 50.5% interest
S.. [did not] comprise at least two-thirds of all UOP shares." Id. at 707. The merger was
approved at the shareholder's meeting by 51.9% of the minority shares and 76.2% of out-
standing UOP shares, with only 2.2% of UOP's shares voting against the merger. Id. at 708.
"3 426 A.2d at 1340-41. The plaintiff contended that the merger was consummated
purely for Signal's economic benefit. Id. With respect to the allegedly misleading proxy in-
formation, the plaintiff made three specific charges. Id. at 1350. First, Weinberger con-
tended that Signal's press releases asserting that negotiations had been conducted between
Signal and UOP were inaccurate since UOP never negotiated the price. Id. at 1341. The
only evidence of negotiation by UOP was the suggestion made by its president that some
assurances be given to the employees of UOP about their future and their stock option
plans. 457 A.2d at 705. Indeed, the word "negotiations," which was used in the original
proxy statement, was changed to "discussions" after the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion inquired into the nature of the negotiations. Id. at 708. Second, Weinberger argued that
the inclusion of the fairness opinion by Lehman Brothers, an "independent" investment
banking firm, in the proxy materials was misleading since Lehman Brothers allegedly was
biased and had prepared the opinion in a cursory fashion. 426 A.2d at 1341. Third, the
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directors breached its fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders
by failing to negotiate for a greater price per share.14 The Delaware
Court of Chancery rejected the plaintiff's arguments and held that
the merger had a valid business purpose and was entirely fair to
the minority shareholders.15
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed."$ Writing
for a unanimous court,17 Justice Moore noted that majority share-
holders bear the ultimate burden of proving the fairness of a
merger, although a plaintiff first must establish some ground for
inquiring into the fairness of the transaction.1 8 The court observed,
however, that when an informed majority of the minority share-
holders vote to approve a merger, the burden of proving the action
was unfair rests on the plaintiff.19 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that since the minority in Weinberger had cast an unin-
formed vote, the ultimate burden of proof remained on UOP.20
plaintiff maintained that the proxy statements were inaccurate because the Signal-affiliated
board members did not vote on the merger. Id. at 1351. Finally, the plaintiff introduced
expert financial testimony to prove that the minority's interest was worth at least $26 per
share. 457 A.2d at 712. The analyst used two methods of valuation-"a comparative analysis
of the premium paid over market in ten other tender offer-merger combinations, and a dis-
counted cash flow analysis." Id.
14 426 A.2d at 1341. The president of UOP told the executive board of Signal that he
thought that the proposed $20 to $21 price range was "generous." 457 A.2d at 705. After
consulting with the non-Signal directors of UOP, the president suggested that the higher
price would be more acceptable to UOP. Id. at 706. No representative of UOP suggested
that a price in excess of $21 be considered. 426 A.2d at 1353. Indeed, the board of directors
of UOP did not even inquire into the actual value of the minority shares, despite the fact
that the corporation's books did not reflect the true value of substantial corporate assets. Id.
" 426 A.2d at 1350, 1363. The vice chancellor held that Signal's conclusion that the
UOP acquisition would be a good investment constituted a valid business purpose. Id. at
1350. With respect to the entire fairness issue, the court found that UOP did, in fact, negoti-
ate for a $21 price per share, id. at 1352, and that the price offered was fair under the
standard appraisal method, id. at 1362. The court concluded, therefore, that UOP's proxy
information and Signal's press releases were not misleading, id. at 1353, and that the UOP
board of directors did not breach its fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, id. at 1356.
10 457 A.2d at 703. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the court of chancery judg-
ment in February 1982. See Deutsch, Weinberger v. UOP: Analysis of a Dissent, 6 CoRP. L.
REV. 29, 29 (1983). The 1982 opinion subsequently was withdrawn and the case was reheard
en banc. 457 A.2d at 703 & n.1. For a discussion of the 1982 Weinberger opinion, see
Deutsch, supra, at 29-38.
7 Justice Moore was joined by Chief Justice Herrmann, Justices McNeilly, Quillen, and
Horsey.
Is 457 A.2d at 703. The court emphasized that particular acts of fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct must be alleged to state a valid cause of action. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. The court found that the failure of Signal to disclose material information to the
minority shareholders of UOP constituted a breach of the defendant's fiduciary duty to the
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Turning to the issue of fairness, Justice Moore reiterated the
standard rule: fairness is comprised of fair dealing and fair price.21
Examining the events leading up to the vote, the court found that
the perfunctory negotiations conducted by UOP, the failure of Sig-
nal's board to disclose material information regarding the value of
the shares, and the effect of the unusual time constraints that Sig-
nal imposed upon UOP and its financial advisors, contradicted the
requisites of fair dealing.22 With respect to fair price, Justice
Moore declared that the traditional "Delaware block" approach, by
which a court considers only the assets, market price, and earnings
of a corporation as elements of valuation, was archaic. 23 Thus, the
Supreme Court of Delaware held that a less restrictive method of
valuation was required under the recently amended appraisal stat-
ute, which obligates Delaware courts to consider "all relevant fac-
tors" when determining the fair value of shares.24 This expanded
appraisal remedy, the court determined, affords adequate protec-
tion to dissenting shareholder's interests unless unfair dealing war-
rants equitable relief.25 Finally, the court abrogated the business
purpose requirement, reasoning that the traditional fairness pro-
ceeding and the transformed appraisal remedy obviated the need
for any protection which possibly could be afforded by the business
purpose rule.26
The Weinberger court's reliance on the "liberalized" appraisal
remedy in freezeout mergers appears to balance properly the com-
peting state interests in minority shareholder protection and
corporate flexibility. This Comment will examine the business pur-
pose and entire fairness tests in light of Weinberger and the cur-
rent Delaware appraisal statute,2" and will suggest that the mini-
mum value to be accorded frozen-out shares be determined by
plaintiffs. Id.
21 Id. at 711.
22 Id. at 711-12; see supra note 14.
23 457 A.2d at 712; see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
24 Id. at 713-14. The statute provides, in pertinent part-
[T]he Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the mer-
ger. . . . In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all rele-
vant factors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
2457 A.2d at 714.
28 Id. at 715; see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 30-68 and accompanying text.
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reference to a third-party sale value.2"
DEMISE OF THE Singer BUSINESS PURPOSE RULE
It is submitted that Weinberger is a retreat from the overzeal-
ous protection afforded minority shareholders in Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 29 in which the Supreme Court of Delaware held
that freezeout mergers are invalid absent a legitimate business
purpose and a showing of entire fairness.30 Singer is regarded as a
response to the corporate practice of going public during the in-
flated stock market conditions of the 1960's, and then freezing out
the recently solicited shareholders at low share values in the 1970's
bear market.-1 Although the concept of entire fairness had been
28 See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
29 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled in part, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
30 Id. at 980. Singer involved a two-step merger, in which North American Philips Cor-
poration attempted to merge with Magnavox Company (Magnavox) shortly after acquiring
an 84.1% interest in Magnavox through a successful tender offer. Id. at 971. Although the
value of Magnavox stock was at all relevant times in excess of $10 per share, both the tender
offer and cash-out prices were $9 per share. Id. at 971-72. The plaintiffs brought a class
action to declare the merger a nullity, alleging that the merger lacked a valid business pur-
pose and that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by
accepting an inadequately low price. Id. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs' sole remedy was a statutory appraisal proceed-
ing. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, holding that compliance with
the merger statute did not relieve the defendants of their fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders. Id. at 975. The court further held that this fiduciary duty not only required
such mergers to be entirely fair to the minority shareholders, id. at 976, but also prohibited
the consummation of a merger transacted for the exclusive purpose of freezing out the mi-
nority shareholders, id. at 980.
31 See Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. Rav. 1101,
1112 (1978). In addition to the advantage to be gained from depressed market prices, corpo-
rations that go private also will be able to avoid compliance with SEC regulations in the
future. Comment, An Appraisal of Authority for the Fairness Standard Contained in the
SEC's Proposed "Going-Private" Regulations, 28 EMORY L.J. 111, 114 (1979). Going-private
transactions were considered an abuse of the public, see Note, supra, at 1112, since the
minority shareholders' interest in the corporation was terminable at the will of the majority
shareholders, see Note, Going Private Problems, supra note 1, at 78 n.5. Indeed, the prob-
lem had reached such proportions that the commissioner of the SEC expressed concern over
the public shareholder hostility engendered by such transactions. Address by Commissioner
Sommer, Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 1974), reprinted in
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 278, at D-1 (1974); see Note, supra, at 1112. Nevertheless,
in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that "[t]here
may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern [such] mergers," but
refused to extend federal jurisdiction under rule 10b-5 to mergers in the absence of congres-
sional intent to regulate mere corporate mismanagement, id. at 479-80. It has been sug-
gested that Singer may have been an attempt by the Delaware Supreme Court to avoid
federal intervention in the traditional state regulation of mergers. See Chazen, "UOP"
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established in Delaware long before Singer,32 the requirement that
mergers be effected for a legitimate business purpose was novel in
Delaware.3 3 Unfortunately, what will pass muster as a valid busi-
ness purpose has never adequately been articulated. 4 A merger
transacted for the exclusive purpose of freezing out minority share-
holders was invalid under the Singer rule.3 5 Post-Singer decisions,
however, have indicated that the business purpose requirement
could be satisfied if the merger advanced the interests of either the
acquiring or the acquired corporation.3 6 Since few mergers would
be pursued that did not advance the interests of either corpora-
Shows Delaware Merger Laws Still Confusing, Legal Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at 15, col. 1;
Note, supra, at 1112.
'2 See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
" See Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, What Constitutes a Valid Purpose for a Merger?,
51 TEMP. L.Q. 852, 852 (1978). The business purpose test emerged in the 1970's as a vehicle
for protecting minority shareholders' equity participation in corporate matters. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir.) (valid business test required
under Georgia corporation law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). Prior to Singer, Delaware
courts had granted equitable relief only when fraud or illegality was demonstrated. See, e.g.,
Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) (refusing to set aside merger of
parent and subsidiary absent fraud or illegality); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.,
281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971) (minority shareholder may be eliminated by corporate reor-
ganization absent gross unfairness). However, the Stauffer court observed that since the
purpose of the short form merger statute is to permit a parent corporation to terminate the
minority shareholders' equity participation, it was unlikely that any merger effected in ac-
cordance with the statute would be deemed fraudulent. 187 A.2d at 80.
34 See Greene, supra note 3, at 500; Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 33, at 881.
33 See Singer, 380 A.2d at 980. The Singer court unequivocally stated that "a § 251
merger, made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the
corporate process." Id. One commentator has concluded that "any purpose for the merger
other than eliminating the minority will suffice." Note, supra note 31, at 1101. In Roland
Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), overruled in part, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the contention that the
Delaware short-form merger statute created a presumption of a legitimate business purpose
for such mergers. 407 A.2d at 1037. Indeed, the Roland court found that the parent corpora-
tion had masterminded the going-private merger exclusively for the purpose of eliminating
the public shareholders. Id.
36 Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del. 1977), overruled in
part, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d
1372, 1376 (Del. Ch. 1978). The Singer court had expressly left unresolved the question of
whether the interests of the subsidiary corporation must be served to satisfy the business
purpose rule. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980 n.11. The question was answered in the negative by
the Tanzer court, which stated that a parent corporation's interest in eliminating its long
term debt financing was a bona fide reason for acquiring exclusive ownership of a subsidi-
ary. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124-25. Courts also have found a valid business purpose present
when a parent corporation acts to avoid potential insolvency, see Polin v. Conductron Corp.,
552 F.2d 797, 815-16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977) (applying Delaware law),
and to reduce operating costs, see Tanzer Economic Assocs. v. Universal Food Specialties,
Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 182, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
19831
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tion, this broad interpretation has rendered the rule illusory.3 7 In
recognition of the limited protection afforded by such a construc-
tion of the rule, the Delaware Court of Chancery in Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 8 implied that a corporation could not satisfy the busi-
ness purpose test if a less restrictive alternative was available to
achieve the stated corporate purpose.3 9 Apparently, no other courts
have embraced such a narrow interpretation of the business pur-
pose rule.40
Apart from the uncertainties resulting from inconsistent judi-
cial interpretation of the rule, it is submitted that the business
purpose test is unsound because it purports to protect the form of
a shareholder's investment rather than the value of the shares. 1
Judicial concern with the shareholder's right to participate in the
management of a corporation is a needless reversion to the repudi-
ated common-law notion that shareholders possess a property right
in the corporation.42 A modern shareholder is more concerned with
37 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 725; Borden, Delaware Court Writes a
Fresh Script For New Going Private Performances, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1983, at 29, col 1.
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have commented that the business purpose test affords
minority shareholders less protection than general fiduciary principles which mandate that
none of the shareholders be injured by the transaction. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 3, at 725.
:a 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
D See id. at 1377 (dictum); McBride, Delaware Corporation Law: Judicial Scrutiny of
Mergers-the Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAw. 2231, 2244
(1978). In Young, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that the majority's desire to reduce
its taxes could be accomplished without freezing out minority shareholders by means of
"other corporate acquisitions." 382 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. Ch. 1978). This less restrictive
alternative theory was "a striking deviation from the Delaware courts' customary reluctance
to second-guess corporate managers' business judgments." See Weiss, supra note 1, at 669
n.291.
40 See Comment, Young v. Valhi, Inc.: Extended Protection to Minority Shareholders
in Freeze-out Mergers, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 683, 704-06 (1979). The Indiana Su-
preme Court analogized a freezeout merger transacted without a valid business purpose to a
voluntary dissolution of the corporation, and defined a valid business purpose as one "in-
tended to advance a corporate interest." Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d
345, 355-56 (1977). The New York judicial interpretation of the business purpose rule com-
ports with the Singer view. See Klurfeld v. Equity Enters., Inc., 79 App. Div. 2d 124, 135,
436 N.Y.S.2d 303, 309 (2d Dep't 1981); Alpert v. 28 William St. Corp., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10,
1983, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 97 App. Div. 2d 681, 468 N.Y.S.2d 289
(1st Dep't 1983). New York courts, however, treat business purpose simply as an element of
fairness. See Klurfeld, 79 App. Div. 2d at 135, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 309; Alpert, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
10, 1983, at 11, col. 6.
" See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977), overruled in part, Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
42 See 1 M. LPTON & E. STEINERGER, supra note 1, § 9.3.3.1, at 444. Although the
Singer court recognized the obsolescence of the common-law notion that a shareholder had
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maximizing the return on an investment than with retaining its
form.43 Moreover, the need for shareholder protection must be bal-
anced with the strong public policy favoring corporate flexibility
and growth.44 Granting injunctive relief when a valid business pur-
pose has not been demonstrated promotes neither policy interest
and, in fact, fosters litigation to a greater degree than the more
restrictive test of fiduciary fairness. 45 It is submitted that the chil-
ling effect of the business purpose rule on corporations attempting
to consummate a value-enhancing merger is damaging both to cor-
porate growth and to shareholder interests. 6
vested rights in the corporation, 380 A.2d 969, 978 (Del. 1977); see supra note 2, the court
nevertheless posited that fiduciary principles mandate that frozen-out shareholders be ac-
corded a legally protected right to their stockholdings, 380 A.2d at 977. The Singer interpre-
tation of the majority's fiduciary duty, however, is related to the vested rights theory in that
both are based on the minority shareholder's right to maintain the form of his investment.
See Note, Going Private Problems, supra note 1, at 99. It would appear, therefore, that the
business purpose test must yield to the same countervailing policy interest in corporate flex-
ibility that replaced the vested rights theory. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPO-
RATION LAW 331-32 (1972); infra note 45 and accompanying text.
43 See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop-
ments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 925 (1982); Note, Going Pri-
vate Problems, supra note 1, at 99-100.
44 See Weiss, supra note 1, at 629.
45 See Borden, supra note 37, at 29, col 1; Note, Singer Fairness Standards, supra note
1, at 937; Note, Freezeout Merger Regulation: An SEC Rule Joins State Efforts, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 964, 969-70 (1980). After Singer, one commentator observed that any Dela-
ware freezeout merger is subject to judicial scrutiny "[b]ecause the corporate majority has
the burden under Singer of demonstrating business purpose .... [and] the dissenting
shareholders apparently need only make allegations of impropriety to activate judicial scru-
tiny of the merger." Note, supra, at 969-70. Indeed, Justice Quillen, vigorously dissenting in
Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1037 (Del. 1979) (Quillen, J., dissenting), noted
the absurdity of permitting a plaintiff to obtain a judicial valuation of share price when he
simply alleges an improper business purpose. Id. at 1039. Justice Quillen stated:
[T]he plaintiff comes to Court more than five months after the required notice to
the corporation under the statutorily established appraisal procedures and says he
wants more money for his shares and the privilege of subjecting the defendants to
a separate class action. He does not specifically allege or even argue to any preci-
sion why the statutory appraisal procedure is inadequate in this case. In my opin-
ion, he has failed to state a claim upon which equitable relief can be granted ....
Id. at 1039-40 (footnote omitted).
It is suggested that the business purpose test and its corresponding threat of equitable in-
tervention invite more litigation than both the statutory appraisal remedy and the Wein-
berger fairness proceeding. Under Weinberger, a plaintiff must "allege specific acts of fraud,
misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the
merger. . . ." 457 A.2d at 703. Moreover, the statutory appraisal proceeding is unavailable
to any stockholder who consents to a merger or fails to comply with rigid filing require-
ments. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a), (d) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §
623(a)-(c), (f)-(h) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
"8 Fischel, supra note 43, at 928 & n.82. Arguably, the business purpose rule enhances a
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The demise of the business purpose rule, as the Weinberger
court observed, does not leave minority shareholders unpro-
tected.47 Inquiry into the business purpose for a transaction does
not protect a dissenting shareholder's interest in the value of his
investment, nor does it shield him from the effects of self-dealing
or fraud.48 The statutory appraisal proceeding and the fairness in-
quiry, however, are designed, respectively, to ensure that the dis-
senting shareholder receives fair value and to protect against
fiduciary misconduct.49 It is submitted, therefore, that the Wein-
berger court correctly declined to apply the business purpose rule
in freezeout mergers.50 It is suggested that other jurisdictions
adopt the analysis employed in Weinberger when confronted with
a business purpose argument.
ENTIRE FAIRNSS UNDER Weinberger
The concept of entire fairness, which embraces both fair deal-
ing and fair price, was introduced in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp.,51 and was applied to freezeout mergers in Singer v.
minority shareholder's bargaining position, since the possibility of litigation looms over the
controlling shareholders. See id. Unfortunately, minority shareholders may abuse this
greater bargaining power by demanding "extortionate prices," Note, supra note 31, at 1110,
and delaying the consummation of the merger, see Note, supra note 45, at 970. Because
freezeout mergers are often designed to take advantage of economies of scale and to remove
impediments to corporate development, see, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
708 (Del. 1983), the chilling effect of the business purpose rule could impinge upon value-
enhancing transactions, see Fischel, supra note 43, at 928.
47 See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
40 See Note, Assuring Fairness in Corporate Mergers: Recent State Trends, 35 WASH.
& LEE L. RE V. 927, 946-47 (1978). It has been argued that the business purpose test emerged
as a device to circumvent complex valuation issues, Weiss, supra note 1, at 670, and often
distracts courts from the larger issue of entire fairness, see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 4, at 1375; Note, supra, at 946. Indeed, it appears that Delaware courts have couched
determinations of fairness in business purpose rhetoric. Weiss, supra note 1, at 670 &
nn.297-98 (citing Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978), and Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)).
'9 See infra note 60.
50 See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers In Phase
Six, 4 CARDozo L. REv. 245, 249 (1983); cf. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, §
9.6, at 485 ("in theory [no business purpose] should be necessary"); Brudney & Chirestein,
supra note 4, at 1375 (asserting that allegation of business purpose should be unnecessary);
Note, supra note 4, at 241 (business purpose test is "confusing and unnecessary and should
be abolished").
"' 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). Sterling involved a merger of the Hilton Hotel
Corporation and its subsidiary, the Mayflower Hotel Corporation. Id. at 296, 93 A.2d at 109.
Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, the minority shareholders of the subsidiary
exchanged their shares for an equal number of shares in the parent. Id. at 296, 93 A.2d at
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Magnavox Co. 52 Resort to the entire fairness doctrine to examine
the propriety of freezeouts is based on the assumption that judicial
review can serve as a substitute for the arm's-length negotiation
presumed absent in interested director transactions."3 While the
fairness test requires a balancing of fair dealing and fair price, 4
Weinberger indicates that the fair price/appraisal proceeding is the
predominant remedy.55 Thus, this Comment will examine fair deal-
ing and fair price separately.
Fair Dealing
Weinberger affords equitable relief to dissenting shareholders
only to remedy unfair dealing.s6 A plaintiff initially must offer
some evidence of unfair dealing as a prerequisite to maintaining
108, 109. Although a freezeout merger was not involved, the transaction constituted an in-
terested merger since the parent corporation stood on both sides of the deal. Id. at 298, 93
A.2d at 110; see Moore, supra note 4, at 674. The Sterling court held that majority share-
holders who are "interested" in a merger owe a fiduciary duty to the minority and must
prove the entire fairness of the merger. 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110. The court, how-
ever, did not define the parameters of the entire fairness test. See Note, supra note 4, at
230.
In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971), the Delaware
Court of Chancery held that an inquiry into the entire fairness of a freezeout merger will
not be made when the plaintiff alleges only an unfair price because the statutory appraisal
proceeding provides an adequate remedy. Id. at 35-36. Interestingly, the Weinberger court
has adopted the same approach. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
52 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977), overruled in part, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
53 See Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Dela-
ware Law, 2 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 44, 46 (1977). Under the business judgment rule, "[t]he acts of
directors are presumptively acts taken in good faith and inspired for the best interests of
the corporation, and a minority stockholder who challenges their bona fides of purpose has
the burden of proof." Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (1966) (cita-
tion omitted). Courts applying the rule, therefore, refuse to question the business judgment
of a director in the absence of fraud. See Nathan & Shapiro, supra, at 45. When controlling
shareholders or directors stand on both sides of a transaction, however, the burden is on the
interested parties to demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair. See id. at 45-46.
"Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. The Weinberger court observed that "[t]he test for
fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness." Id.
5 See id. at 714; Kramer, Minority Shareholders Hit by Recent Delaware Case,
N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1983, at 31, col. 3.
6 See 457 A.2d at 714. The Weinberger court granted the chancellor power "to fashion
any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate" to remedy unfair dealing.
Id. The Weinberger decision expressly provides for rescissory damages as appropriate equi-
table relief and permits rescission of the merger itself when fraud or self-dealing is present.
457 A.2d at 714.
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such an action.57 The Weinberger court observed that "fraud, mis-
representation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or
gross and palpable overreaching" constitute unfair dealing.5 8 Nev-
ertheless, although some indications of unfairness may be present,
they may be outweighed by an equitable price.' 9 In short, the
Weinberger analysis permits equitable intervention only when the
minority shareholder is significantly disadvantaged.60 By limiting
equitable relief to egregious circumstances, this approach, it is sug-
gested, will encourage shareholders to utilize the appraisal pro-
ceeding to recoup the value of their investment, and diminish the
threat to corporate flexibility posed by the uncertain availability of
equitable relief.6 1
The Weinberger court observed that an independent negotiat-
ing committee,62 absent in the freezeout, could have approximated
arm's-length negotiation,63 and provided "strong evidence" of fair
dealing.64 In an attempt to provide additional guidelines for ascer-
57 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
86 Id. at 714; see Klimpl, Stein & Hayworth, Merger Case Will Impact on Minority
Shareholder, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1983, at 38, col. 3.
59 457 A.2d at 711 ("price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other
features of the merger").
60 It is submitted that equitable relief is necessary to protect minority shareholders
only in circumstances that constitute unfair dealing. Shareholders who are not victims of
overreaching, self-dealing, or nondisclosure have the ability to perfect their appraisal rights.
Equitable relief under such circumstances must, then, be considered superfluous and an
impingement on corporate autonomy. Moreover, since appraisal statutes typically require
minority shareholders to notify the corporation of their intent to dissent prior to a vote on a
proposed long-form merger, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (Supp. 1982); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982), restricting minority shareholders to the
remedy of appraisal will encourage dissenting shareholders to manifest their dissatisfaction
before the consummation of the merger.
61 Cf. Fischel, supra note 43, at 928 (asserting that the effect of Singer was to allow
minority shareholders to "blackmail" the majority).
0' 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
13 Id.; see Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 53, at 47 & n.9.
4 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (dictum). The Weinberger court stated:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have been
entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of
its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length. Since fairness in this con-
text can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent, board of
directors acting upon the matter before them, it is unfortunate that this course
apparently was neither considered nor pursued. Particularly in a parent-subsidi-
ary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the contending
parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm's length
is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
Id. (citations omitted). Prior to Weinberger, commentators had noted that negotiations con-
ducted by an independent committee obviated the need for an entire fairness inquiry since
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taining whether fair dealing is present, it has been suggested that a
fairness opinion rendered by an independent banking firm prior to
the dissemination of proxy materials is evidence of both fair deal-
ing and fair price.8 5 Formal approval of a merger by a majority of
the minority shareholders has also been proposed as an indication
of fairness." At least one commentator, however, maintains that
minority shareholder approval is not a true substitute for arm's-
length negotiation since the transaction involved is often a "take it
or leave it proposition. '87 Thus, by requiring the plaintiff to prove
the unfairness of a merger in the face of a majority of the minor-
ity's approval, the Weinberger court apparently has given undue
weight to the vote of minority shareholders. It is suggested that the
minority shareholder vote should be considered only as a factor in
the fair dealing analysis, and not as a circumstance triggering a
shift in the burden of proof to the dissenting shareholder."'
such negotiations could be reviewed adequately within the framework of the business judg-
ment rule. See Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public
Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAw. 1439,
1440-41 (1981); Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 53, at 47; see also Harriman v. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 142 (D. Del. 1975); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693,
696 (Del. Ch. 1971). Lipton and Steinberger have suggested that negotiations be opened not
only to an independent negotiating committee, but to "sophisticated holders of a significant
part of the public interest in the corporation" as well. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEMBERGER, supra
note 1, § 9.6, at 485.
Although the presence of an independent negotiating committee generally is recognized
as an element of fair dealing, it is submitted that the Weinberger court may have exagger-
ated its significance. In actual practice, commentators have noted that an independent nego-
tiating committee often is a more vigorous advocate for the interests of the majority share-
holders than those of the minority. Kramer, supra note 55, at 34, col. 1; Weiss, supra note
50, at 255.
65 See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 9.6, at 485. Corporations fre-
quently request their investment banker to update the fairness opinion to reflect any
changes that may have occurred in the company's financial status during the interval be-
tween the approval of the initial opinion rendered at the time of the merger and the subse-
quent dissemination of proxy materials. Chazen, supra note 64, at 1463. The Weinberger
court, however, discounted the fairness opinion in light of the cursory manner in which it
was prepared. 457 A.2d at 712; see Chazen, supra note 31, at 19, col. 2. Professor Weiss has
suggested that "[i]f reliance is to be placed on an investment banker's opinion, that opinion
should be framed in terms of 'adequacy' or 'inadequacy,' not 'fairness' or 'reasonableness.'"
Weiss, supra note 50, at 256.
" See, e.g., Chazen, supra note 64, at 1476; Note, supra note 4, at 236 n.98; Note, supra
note 48, at 937.
67 Chazen, supra note 64, at 1475; accord Weiss, supra note 1, at 677; Note, supra note
4, at 236 n.98.
es See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Fair Price/Appraisal
Determinations of the value of a dissenting shareholder's stock
in fairness hearings traditionally have been based on statutory ap-
praisal.69 Most courts have adopted the "Delaware block" ap-
proach, a method of valuation in which a corporation's assets, mar-
ket price, and earnings are assigned a separate weight of
percentage value.70 Stock market price, however, frequently is
given primary consideration under the Delaware block method.7 1
Indeed, a prior Delaware appraisal statute precluded shareholders
from invoking the appraisal remedy if the market value of their
shares was readily ascertainable on a national stock exchange. 2
Today, however, it has become common practice for acquiring cor-
porations to offer premiums of up to 50% more than the market
price of the stock. 3 Clearly, the Delaware block method, as noted
in Weinberger, does not provide a fair appraisal of share value, and
is, therefore, "outmoded. 71 4
The use of the Delaware block approach in fairness proceed-
ings has been subject to pervasive criticism.7 5 Arguably, fiduciary
'9 Weiss, supra note 1, at 671; see, e.g., Klurfeld v. Equity Enters., Inc., 79 App. Div. 2d
124, 135, 436 N.Y.S.2d 303, 310 (2d Dep't 1981).
70 See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 499 (Del. 1981); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 3, at 732; Hertz, Corporate Action, in 1 BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS § 6.302b,
at 228-29 (J. Herz & C. Bailer 2d ed. 1981); Weiss, supra note 1, at 672. Earnings value
represents the earning potential of the acquired company as an ongoing business; net asset
value is an estimate of the assets of the acquired company upon liquidation. See Nathan &
Shapiro, supra note 53, at 52, 56. Under the Delaware block method, "all factors relevant to
a determination of fair price in a particular situation [are] examined and given appropriate
weight." Id. at 49; see Borden, supra note 37, at 29, col. 3.
'1 See Hertz, supra note 70, § 6.302, at 227; Nathan & Shapiro, supra note 53, at 51-52.
But see L. SOLOMON, R. STEVsNS & D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 953 (1982)
("asset value and earnings value usually receive the greatest weight"). In the case of corpo-
rations engaged primarily in real estate for which no readily ascertainable market value
exists, net asset value will be accorded the greatest weight. See Hertz, supra note 70, §
6.302a-b, at 228-29.
7 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(k) (1983)); L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENS & D. SCHWARTZ, supra note 71, at 953-54 (statute
reflects theory that "the ability to sell on the open market provides an adequate means of
escape for the dissenting shareholder").
73 Chazen, supra note 64, at 1450-51. Prior to the tender offer in Weinberger, the com-
mon stock of UOP had been traded at less than $14 per share. 457 A.2d at 704.
7" 457 A.2d at 713; see L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENS & D. SCHWARTZ, supra note 71, at 953-
54; Chazen, supra note 64, at 1451; Borden, supra note 37, at 30, col. 1. But see Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 3, at 732 ("no evidence that shareholders are undercompensated in
appraisal proceedings").
75 See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297, 312-13 (1974); Chazen, supra note 64, at 1451; Note, Going Private
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principles mandate that minority stockholders share in the "syner-
gistic" benefits of a merger-that is, the advantages that accrue to
the acquiring corporation through consummation of the merger. r
Some commentators assert that since the purpose of a fairness pro-
ceeding is to approximate arm's-length negotiation, a third-party
sale value should be used to evaluate the price of minority shares. 77
Discounted cash flow is often considered by modern financial ana-
lysts to be an important factor in appraising the third-party sale
value of a corporation.7 s The Delaware block approach, however,
does not provide any means of evaluating either discounted cash
flow or the synergistic effects of a merger.7 9
Delaware and New York recently amended their appraisal
statutes to include concepts of fairness in recognition of the need
Problems, supra note 1, at 116.
7' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1371-74; see 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 1, § 9.6, at 486-88. Professors Brudney and Chirestein were the first commenta-
tors to propose gain-sharing principles in parent-subsidiary mergers. See Brudney & Chirel-
stein, supra note 75, at 297. Observing that true arm's-length bargaining was impossible in
parent-subsidiary mergers, id. at 317-19, Brudney and Chireistein concluded that the par-
ent's fiduciary duty to its minority shareholders requires receipt by all shareholders of an
equal return on their investment, id. at 322. They caution, however, that minority share-
holders should be given equal, though not necessarily identical, treatment to that given the
majority shareholders. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1358. Since freezeout
mergers frequently produce a new corporation with a greater value than either company
would have enjoyed as a separate entity, see id. at 1371, Brudney & Chirelstein argue that a
pro rata share of this increase in value should be distributed to minority shareholders. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 75, at 322. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d
1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), the Seventh Circuit expressly applied a
gain-sharing test to determine fair share value in a freezeout merger, id. at 1248. The Dela-
ware Court of Chancery, however, held that the synergistic effect of a freezeout merger
could not be considered in either a fairness or a statutory appraisal proceeding. Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 394-95 (Del. Ch. 1979). For an extensive criticism of
gain sharing in freezeout mergers and other corporate control transactions, see Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 3, at 703-15, 726-31.
77 See 1 M. LIroN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 1.2.1, at 43 (Supp. 1979); Chazen,
supra note 64, at 1450-51. The third-party value standard requires that a fair cash-out price
be, at minimum, "the price per share that could have been obtained if the acquired com-
pany had been sold, as an entirety, to another purchaser .. . " Chazen, supra note 64, at
1450 (footnote omitted). Chazen acknowledges that third-party sale value in parent-subsidi-
ary mergers actually may be a competitive rather than an arm's-length price, id. at 1470-71,
but advocates the third-party sale value standard as a "safe harbor" for establishing a fair
cash-out price, id. at 1477.
78 See AcQUIsrboN AND MERGER NEGOTIATING STRATEGY 109-12 (M. Strage ed. 1971).
7 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1360-61 (Del. Ch. 1981) (the discounted
cash flow method does not "correspond with either logic or the existing law"), rev'd, 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 394-95 (Del. Ch.
1979) (synergistic effects could not be considered under the appraisal statute).
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for reform in appraisal proceedings.80 New York's amended stat-
ute, which is the more progressive of the two, permits courts to
employ any valuation methods utilized by the financial community
and to consider "all other relevant factors.""' As the legislative his-
tory of the statute makes clear, the value of the corporation as a
whole may be used to ascertain the fair value of its shares. s2 Al-
though the Delaware statute also allows courts to employ an "all
relevant factors" analysis, the statute expressly excludes "any ele-
ment of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger."83 Nevertheless, the Weinberger court, apparently in-
fluenced by the broad sweep of the New York statute, refused to
construe strictly the Delaware statute.8 4 The Weinberger opinion
suggests that the statute should be construed to include the mod-
ern valuation techniques utilized by the financial community and
exclude only those elements of post-merger value that are purely
speculative in nature.8 5
Commentators have observed that the Weinberger interpreta-
tion of the Delaware appraisal statute would permit employment
of a third-party sale value standard to evaluate frozen-out shares. 8
It is suggested that Professor Weiss has correctly maintained that
a third-party sale value should be the standard utilized by courts
so See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713-14; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 623(h)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982). Delaware's prior appraisal statute
simply provided that "[tihe Court [should] . . . determine the value of the stock." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (1974).
81 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
82 Ch. 202, § 1, [1982] N.Y. Laws 621 (McKinney). The New York Legislature declared:
The case law interpretation of fair value has not always reflected the reality of
corporate business combinations. These transactions involve the sale of the corpo-
ration as a whole, and the corporation's value as an entirety may be substantially
in excess of the actual or hypothetical market price for shares trading among in-
vestors. Thus, experience has demonstrated that large premiums over market
price are commonplace in mergers and in asset acquisitions.
Id.
83 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982).
See Borden, supra note 37, at 29, col. 1.
88 See 457 A.2d at 714.
88 See Weiss, supra note 50, at 251-52; Chazen, supra note 31, at 19, col. 4. Weinberger
suggests that the parent corporation has a fiduciary obligation to disclose to the subsidiary
and its minority shareholders the highest price the parent is willing to pay for the acquisi-
tion of the minority's shares. See 457 A.2d at 709. This obligation to disclose, it is submit-
ted, may have the practical effect of inducing the parent corporation to offer its subsidiary
the highest price it is willing to pay to eliminate the minority, since few minority sharehold-




to establish the minimum cash-out price.8 7 Although it may be ar-
gued that the use of a third-party sale value "go[es] well beyond
. . . giving the minority the protection it would have in an acquisi-
tion negotiated at arm's length,"' Professor Weiss notes that the
majority's fiduciary duty both to the parent's shareholders and to
the subsidiary's minority shareholders dictates the use of such an
appraisal value, "for if the subsidiary is worth more to a third
party than it is to the parent company, presumably [all] sharehold-
ers would benefit if the subsidiary were sold."89
In addition to interpreting the Delaware appraisal statute as
permitting any valuation method utilized by the financial commu-
nity, the Weinberger court determined that the "all relevant fac-
tors" language of the statute was designed to "[include] any dam-
ages, resulting from the taking, which the stockholders sustain as a
class."90 This broad language may be construed as authorizing Del-
aware courts to grant dissenting shareholders "compensation for
cancelled stock options, incurred tax liability, and loss of the own-
ership right which under normal circumstances entitles a stock-
holder to buy or sell according to hiw [sic] own whim."9' 1 Awarding
such damages in an appraisal proceeding would ameliorate the ad-
verse effects created by the "forced sale" of the frozen-out shares
and would, in essence, protect any shareholder interest in the form
87 See Weiss, supra note 50, at 251. Professor Weiss has suggested that a third-party
sale standard would inhibit only those freezeouts that are designed to exploit minority
shareholders and would not prevent the consummation of mergers transacted to achieve
economies of size. Id.
" Chazen, supra note 31, at 19, col. 4. It has been observed that third-party acquisi-
tions yield a higher premium over market than similar acquisitions by a parent-majority
shareholder since the third party must pay for the control shares. Id. Thus, it can be argued
that a third-party sale value standard in freezeout mergers unjustly would require the par-
ent corporation to pay a control premium for shares in a corporation it already controls. Id.
Il Weiss, supra note 50, at 251-53.
90 457 A.2d at 713.
"1 Klimpl, Stein & Hayworth, supra note 58, at 38, col. 1. It is submitted that the New
York appraisal statute, containing language similar to that of its Delaware counterpart, also
could be interpreted to permit dissenting shareholders to recover for canceled stock options,
incurred tax liability, and the loss of ownership rights. The New York appraisal statute
provides, in pertinent part:
In fixing the fair value of the shares, the court shall consider the nature of the
transaction giving rise to the shareholder's right to receive payment for shares and
its effects on the corporation and its shareholders, the concepts and methods then
customary in the relevant securities and financial markets for determining fair
value of shares of a corporation engaging in a similar transaction under compara-
ble circumstances and all other relevant factors.
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. L. § 623(h)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (emphasis added).
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of his investment without impeding the consummation of a poten-
tially value-enhancing merger.92
CONCLUSION
Weinberger is both a summary and a clarification of the pro-
tection that Delaware law affords a shareholder whose equity par-
ticipation in a corporation has been frozen out by the consumma-
tion of a merger. First, a merger may not be challenged by
dissenting shareholders on the ground that the transaction lacked
a valid business purpose. Second, shareholders dissatisfied with the
share price offered by the parent corporation will be relegated to
an appraisal proceeding, with equitable intervention available only
upon a showing of unfair dealing. This restriction on equitable re-
lief, it is suggested, adequately promotes the state's interest in mi-
nority shareholder protection without unnecessarily impeding
corporate flexibility and development. The appraisal proceeding,
moreover, largely has been reformed, permitting Delaware courts
to consider not only market value, earnings, and assets, but all fac-
tors relevant to a determination of share value. It is suggested that
the price a third party would offer for the purchase of the dissent-
ing shares be adopted in appraisal proceedings as the minimum
value of the shares. Such a standard, taken as the ground of share
evaluation, would aid in offsetting the superior bargaining position
enjoyed by the controlling shareholders and would ensure adequate
consideration for the minority's shares.
Donna M. Morello
92 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
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